Latest Cases

Pension – Pension scheme. The case concerned the tax liabilities on pensions, where the appellant police officers had retired before the normal minimum pension age of 55. The appellants appealed against a decision of the Pensions Ombudsman dismissing their complaints that they had not been made aware that retiring when they had done would make them liable to additional tax. The Chancery Division held that the appeal of two appellants against the Avon and Somerset police authority would be allowed. The case of three appellants against the Essex police authority would be remitted to the Pensions Ombudsman. However, the relevant chief constables were not liable to the appellants for the adverse tax consequences of what had occurred.

Immigration – Detention. The appellants had challenged their detention on immigration reasons by the respondent Secretary of State, the first appellant succeeding to a certain extent whilst the second appellant's claim had been dismissed. The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) held that, in both cases, the judge ought to have found that the Secretary of State had breached the public sector equality duty and had discriminated against the appellants by failing to make reasonable adjustments in breach of ss 20 and 29 of the Equality Act 2010.

Company – Shares. The parties' applications for summary judgment in a dispute concerning the sale of a company were largely unsuccessful. The Commercial Court held that, among other things, while the paragraph in issue of the share purchase agreement between the parties was a condition precedent, there were disputes of a factual nature as to whether or not the condition precedent to an expert determination has been satisfied, which were of a type which made the case unsuitable for summary judgment.

Religion – Discrimination. In dismissing the appellant student's claim for judicial review of a decision to remove him from a social work course for the expression of religious views on social media, the judge had premised his decision on an incorrect finding. That finding was that the respondent University was not suggesting a blanket ban on the freedom of expression of those who might be called 'traditional believers'. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the appellant's appeal and held that the disciplinary proceedings were flawed and unfair and the matter would be remitted to a differently constituted fitness to practice panel.

Medical treatment – Future mental incapacity. The proceedings gave rise to a novel issue, concerning the respondent (CD), a 27-year-old woman who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, because, while it was common ground that she did not currently lack capacity to make decisions in respect of the birth of her baby and the associated treatment, her clinicians considered that there was a substantial risk that she might become incapacitous in relation to such decisions at a critical moment in her labour. The Court of Protection, in allowing the applicant NHS Trust's application for a contingent and anticipatory declaration, authorising a care plan in respect of CD, held that, in the exceptional circumstances, the court had the power to make such a declaration, contingent on CD losing capacity, pursuant to s 15(1)(c) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The court further ruled that, where a court was making such an order, it was necessary for it to be made in the declaration itself, and that such a declaration should be made on the face of the court order.

Libel and slander – Defamatory words. Applying settled law to the facts, an article published in the Times Newspaper, in its true meaning, was defamatory of the claimant senior prosecutor's professional reputation at common law and had a tendency to cause serious harm to her professional reputation. The Queen's Bench Division so ruled in considering three preliminary issues which arose for determination in a libel action. The article in question concerned the decision to prosecute the English cricketer, Ben Stokes, who was later found not guilty of affray in relation an incident outside a nightclub in Bristol.

Sentence – Wounding with intent. The judge had made insufficient allowance for totality. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, allowed the defendant's appeal against an extended sentence of 26 years, comprising of a custodial term of 21 years and an extension period of 5 years. The appellant would serve half of the three-year sentence for attempted robbery, then concurrent custodial terms of 15 years, eligible for consideration for release on licence after 10 years and, when released, remain on licence for the remainder of his total sentence and a further five years.

Employment – Contract of employment. A clause relied on by the employee in her contract did prohibit shareholdings in any business carried on in competition with the former employer and was impermissibly wide and in restraint of trade, unless it could be severed in some way. The Supreme Court held that applying the severance principle, namely that the words were capable of being removed without the need to add to or modify the wording of the remainder and the removal would not generate any major change in the overall effect of the restraints, the words should be severed and removed.

European Union – Finance. The General Court of the European Union had correctly dismissed the applicant credit institution's action, seeking annulment of Decision ECB/SSM/15/1 of the European Central Bank (the ECB) of 5 January 2015, taken under arts 6(4) and 24(7) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. Consequently, the Court of Justice of the European Union dismissed the applicant's appeal, deciding that the arguments relied on by the applicant lacked merit.

Town and country planning – Planning permission. On its ordinary and natural meaning, planning permission granted in 2014 under s 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, concerning a retail store in London, had to be interpreted as containing a condition restricting the use of the store. The Supreme Court, in allowing the appellant local authority's appeal, held that the 2014 permission had to be seen through the eyes of 'the reasonable reader'. The court considered that, taken at face value, the wording of the operative part of the grant was clear and unambiguous and that there was nothing to indicate an intention to discharge a condition restricting use altogether or, in particular, to remove a restriction on sale of other than non-food goods.