Latest Cases

Libel and slander – Defamatory statement. The claimant's claim for slander and trespass to the person, arising from an incident at the self-service check out area at a Tesco store in Lewisham, in which a customer assistant had allegedly accused her of being a 'thief', was dismissed. The Queen's Bench Division held that the claimant, who had a graduate diploma in legal practice, had not discharged the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that her version of events was correct. The court further held that, even if the words complained of had been spoken, the claimant had been unable to establish the threshold requirement of 'serious harm', within the meaning of s 1 of the Defamation Act 2013.

Police – Pension. The claimant's criticism that the Police Medical Appeal Board had failed to reach decisions on key factual issues in the case, or alternatively had not given adequate reasons as to how it had dealt with those issues, was made out. Accordingly, the Administrative Court allowed the claimant's application for judicial review of its decision refused the claimant's application for a police injury pension.

Medical treatment – Capacity. A brave young man, MB, who had suffered a birth injury due to medical negligence, and who had lived his entire life with profound disability and pain had, if anybody could, earned his right to a peaceful death at home with those he loved. The Court of Protection so ruled, in circumstances where MB's physical condition had seriously deteriorated in hospital, due to a serious and persistent infection, and where the judge had visited MB in hospital and MB had communicated (through non-verbal techniques) his wish to be at home with his mother, being aware that, to do so, would result in his death. The court ruled that the applicant's care plan to facilitate MB's return home remained, not only a viable option, but the best option for him, having regard to the wider landscape of factors, including the commitment of the doctors and the professionals involved, and MB's wishes.

Insolvency – Bankrupt's estate. In a situation where the appellant had been made bankrupt twice, future payments under an income payments order (an IPO) were provable debts in a later bankruptcy commencing after the bankrupt had been discharged from the earlier bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division held, in allowing the appellant's appeal, that future IPO payments were not enforceable by the trustee in the earlier bankruptcy against the bankrupt and that recovery of future IPO payments was restricted to proof in the later bankruptcy.

Costs – Order for costs. The appellants' ATE insurance block-rated premiums taken out in clinical negligence actions had been successfully challenged by the respondent NHS Trusts on the grounds of proportionality and reasonableness. The Court of Appeal (Civil Division), allowing the appeals, set out the principles applicable to a consideration of the reasonableness and proportionality of an ATE insurance policy and set out the right approach to an assessment of costs.

Bankruptcy – Petition. The petitioner's application for the making of a bankruptcy order against his brother, who was the debtor, succeeded, in a dispute concerning the parties' business in property development. The Chancery Division held that the petitioner had not acted unreasonably in refusing an offer made to him by the debtor. Nor had the petition been an abuse of process by having an improper collateral purpose, namely ruining the debtor.

Road traffic – Regulation of traffic. The road traffic regulation order (TRO) prohibiting the use of three linked rural 'green lanes' in designated areas by mechanically propelled vehicles had been lawfully made. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the appeal by the appellant, Trail Riders Fellowship, and held that the trial judge had correctly considered the balancing act in s 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and his discretion could not be challenged.

Judgment – Enforcement. The wording of Sch 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 preserved the long established principle that a debtor's goods became bound by a writ from a particular point in time, and that it was only once the first writ was satisfied out of proceeds that the surplus (if any) could be applied to the second writ, in accordance with writ priority. The Queen's Bench Division so ruled in a dispute between two creditors (365 and Alvini) over which of them was entitled to the benefit of a payment of £12,050 which the debtor had made to an enforcement agent of Court Enforcement Services (CES), in relation to the Alvini debt, in circumstances where the writ of control concerning the 365 debt had been received by its enforcement agent first in time, and where 365 had deferred further action, and had been expecting its first instalment, under an agreement made with the debtor. The court dismissed CES's application to set aside a master's order, requiring it to pay over the money it had collected from the debtor to 365's enforcement agents. It held that priorities were established by the writs and their date of receipt, irrespective of the identities of the Hight Court Enforcement Officers in any given set of circumstances.

Income tax – Penalty. The taxpayer's appeal against penalites imposed on him by the Revenue and Customs Commissioners (HMRC) for the late filing of individual tax returns pursuant to Sch 55 to the Finance Act 2009 was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)(the FTT). On appeal, the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) dismissed the taxpayer's appeal. The tribunal decided that: (i) on the balance of probabilities, notices to file had been sent to the taxpayer in respect of each of the tax years in question; and (ii) the taxpayer's contention that it had been disproportionate to impose those penalties in circumstances where no tax had been due did not amount to a special circumstance for the purposes of para 16 of Sch 55 to that Act.

Extradition – Prohibition on torture. The respondent requesting state's assurances on prison conditions, in particular on living space, would be accepted in the present case. Accordingly, the Divisional Court dismissed the appellants' appeals against orders for their extradition to Turkey on the ground that extradition would expose them to a real risk of being treated in a manner which breached their rights under art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.