Latest Cases

Insolvency – Approval for sale. Where a prior order, (not complied with), was in place over assets sought to be sold by a receiver to third party, it was correct for the receivers to seek approval form the court for the sale. Further, the Chancery Division held that in certain limited circumstances the court had discretion to vary its own order, and in the present situation it would vary its own order, and approve the sale to the third party unencumbered by the earlier order.

Will – Validity. The Chancery Division made rulings relating to a dispute over two wills made by FB. On the evidence, the presumption of due execution had been successfully displaced and FB's will of 2013 had not been executed in accordance with the law. Further, FB had known of and approved the contents of her 2013 will. She had revoked her will of 2012 by asking for it to be revoked.

Practice – Vulnerable adult. In considering three applications for permission to apply for the appointment of personal welfare deputies (PWD) in respect of vulnerable adults, pursuant to s 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Court of Protection clarified the practice, procedure, and the applicable principles, concerning such appointments.

Limitation of action – Period of limitation. In a group (personal injury) action brought against Tata Steel Ltd (Tata), the claimants alleged that some of those employed by Tata's predecessors had been exposed to dust and fumes at work, resulting in them developing occupational diseases. Tata contended that some of the claims were statute-barred and applied to have limitation tried as a preliminary issue. The Queen's Bench Division, in dismissing the application, held that the overriding objective in the group litigation order would not be best served by determining limitation defences by way of the hearing of any preliminary issue or issues.

Social security – Housing benefit. In holding that the correct interpretation of 'bedroom' for the purposes of reg B13(5) of the Housing Benefit (Amendment) Regulations 2012 was a room capable of being used as a bedroom by a particular claimant, the upper tribunal had erred in law and its decision had been wrong. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that, for the purposes of reg B13(5), 'bedroom' was to be interpreted as meaning a room capable of being used as a bedroom by any of the listed categories and not a room capable of being used as a bedroom by the particular claimant.

Company – Shares. The appellant company's action to strike out the name of the respondent company as the holder of all of a related company's issued shares succeeded. The Privy Council held that one of the appellant's representatives, who had purported to sign an agreement between the parties (the HOA), had lacked the ostensible authority to do so. Further, the HOA and the share transfer purportedly made pursuant to it had been avoidable.

Immigration – Leave to enter. The First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)'s reasons why it had held that the appellant Sri Lankan national's refusal of entry clearance had been a disproportionate interference with respect for family life were tolerably clear and had contained no error of law. The Court of Appeal (Civil Division), allowing the appellant's appeal, held that there had been no error in the FTT's decision and the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) had erred in interfering with the decision.

Family Proceedings – Care proceedings. The Slovakian Central Authority's request to transfer care proceedings, concerning three Slovakian children, to the Slovakia courts was refused. The Family Court considered the principles applicable to such applications for a transfer of proceedings under art 15 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2203 and held that, applying settled law to the facts, the balance was firmly in favour of the case remaining in England and Wales at the present time.

Unfair dismissal – Remedies. When ss 115 and 117 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 were read together, an 'order for re-engagement' was not intended to impose an absolute and indefeasible obligation on the employer to re-engage the employee or a correlative right in the employee to be re-engaged. Rather, the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held it created a situation in which the employer had to either re-engage the employee or become liable for the awards specified by s 117 (3), which included an additional award on top of what it would have had to pay if no re-engagement order had been made.

Probate – Grant. The Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court had correctly decided that the marriage contract relating to the testator's second marriage had not prevented the testator from bequeathing his property by testamentary disposition. The Privy Council so held, among other things, in dismissing the appellant daughter's appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision. The Board considered the relevant provisions of the superseded Civil Code of St Lucia of 1879, relating to dower and the effect of a contract of marriage on the ability of a husband to dispose of property by testamentary disposition.